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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses coordination between ships of a force in anti-air
warfare. In support of the need for effective coordination, two coordination
schemes are presented. One is based on earliest intercept time and is a candidate
for future use. Here, the ship with the earliest projected intercept time is directed
to engage the attacker. The second scheme introduces a load sharing feature
wherein current magazine inventories are considered. In line with broad goals of
AAW coordination, several measures of effectiveness to compare the schemes are
introduced and particular attention is given to the utility of these measures of
effectiveness. Potential simulation scenarios and input parameters for a
comparison of the two schemes are then presented along with some specific
suggestions for statistical analysis of the results. The thesis concludes with final
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This thesis is concerned with force anti-air warfare
(AAW) coordination for the U.S. Navy. The Navy is currently
conducting research in order to find an efficient method of
automating the coordination of multiple ships against an
airborne threat. In their proposed work, candidate
coordination schemes will be tested in simulation by the
Naval Warfare Analysis Department at the Applied Physics
Laboratory of The Johns Hopkins University. [Ref. l:p. 12]
This report will present a potential modification to a
candidate force AAW coordination scheme and examine means by
which the modification, as compared to the basic scheme, can
be tested.
A. THE NEED FOR COORDINATION
The need for coordination of ships in battle against an
airborne threat has probably never been as important as it
is today. The need has intensified because of the high
level of performance of both offensive and defensive weapons
at sea. Anti-ship missiles, even those in possession of
third world nations, are fast and deadly. If fired in
sufficient numbers, such missiles have the potential to
overwhelm the defenses of even the most capable ships.
The integration and speed of modern defensive systems
can also be used to illustrate the need for coordination.
These automated systems, if left unchecked, can empty a
ship's magazines in a matter of minutes, thus leaving the
ship's defense severely deteriorated.
Coordination of ships against the air threat is intended
to make timely use of all area defense systems, available
forcewide, in order to counter the threat.
B. THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
As discussed above, this thesis will introduce a
modification to a proposed coordination scheme and explore
means by which the performance of the modification, as
compared with the basic scheme, can be tested.
The attributes of survivability and sustainability and
how they can be related to coordination schemes will be
discussed in Chapter II. The basic coordination scheme and
the modification will also be presented. Chapter II ends
with a discussion of two situations which illustrate the
extreme conditions for the modification.
An overview of the simulation being used at Johns
Hopkins to analyze candidate schemes will be presented in
Chapter III. Such considerations as the input needed and
the output capabilities will be discussed.
In Chapter IV, some measures of effectiveness which can
quantify the hazy concepts of survivability and
sustainability will be explored. Each measure, as it
relates to either survivability or sustainability, will be
described. The potential for non-independence of the
measures will also be investigated.
Chapter V presents a structure for the evaluation of
alternate coordination schemes. In order to ensure that
only the desired attributes are tested, the control of
inputs and simulation scenario parameters will be examined,
Chapter VI provides some final remarks about load
sharing, measures of effectiveness, testing procedures and
suggestions for future work in this subject.
II. EARLIEST INTERCEPT CONCEPT WITH LOAD SHARING
This chapter will identify two of the primary goals of
coordination, define necessary terms, and discuss some of
the factors which can be considered in choosing a
coordination scheme. Two coordination schemes will then be
presented. One scheme which has received attention as a
candidate for the Navy is based upon earliest intercept
time. The scheme, and how it relates to some basic goals of
coordination will be discussed. A second scheme, which is a
modification to the earliest intercept scheme, will then be
introduced. The modification combines a load sharing
feature with the earliest intercept time method. The
chapter will conclude with the exploration of two extreme
cases involving the load sharing feature.
A. SOME GOALS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF COORDINATION
Two overall goals of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) coordination
are to attempt to increase both the survivability and the
sustainability of the force against hostile air threats.
Given these goals, two major factors can be considered in
the choice of coordination schemes. These factors are the
efficient use of battle space, and resource allocation.
1. Battle Space
Battle space is the distance between the attacker
(hostile missile or aircraft) and the center of the friendly
force at the time it is determined that the attacker must be










An engagement is the physical act of launching a missile
salvo at the attacker. A salvo could consist of one, two,
three, or more missiles depending on the missile firing
doctrine being used. Each missile salvo fired represents a
separate engagement.
Battle space depends upon a variety of factors,
including detection range and identification time, not all
of which are in control of the friendly force. Detection
range, or the range at which the attackers are detected,
primarily controls battle space. Detection range, itself,
depends upon a number of factors such as the type of search
radars in use, atmospheric conditions, and the physical size
and flight profiles of the attackers. In a simulation,
keeping types of radars and atmospheric conditions constant,
detection range would depend primarily on the
characteristics of the attackers.
Once an attacker has been detected, another factor
which effects battle space is the time needed to identify
the attacker. The identification process itself is not of
concern here. An assumption for the purposes of simulation
could allow a constant period of time for identification
following the detection of each attacker.
Apart from the considerations discussed thus far,
there remain few considerations affecting battle space. The
effective use of this available distance, called battle
space, becomes critical.
One of the potential purposes of a coordination
scheme is to use the available battle space, described
above, as efficiently as possible in an attempt to increase
the survivability of the force. Survivability can be
increased by taking advantage of every firing opportunity at
the attacker that battle space allows. Wasted firing
opportunities could result in an increase in the number of
attackers which penetrate the defense.
2. Resource Allocation
A primary factor relating to sustainability is
resource allocation. A reduction of wasted missile
resources increases the potential for sustainability.
Efficient allocation of missile resources can be described
by the following three objectives: 1) every attacker is to
be defeated, 2) the fewest number of missiles are to be used
to defeat each attack, and 3) assignments are made such that
no ship is forced to exhaust magazine inventory unless all
ships are nearing zero inventory.
The objective that every attacker is to be defeated
is simple in concept. An attacker will be considered
defeated if it is destroyed, or is sufficiently damaged to
cause it to miss the ships of the force. For study
purposes, defeating and destroying the attacker will be
synonymous. The objective requires that each attacker is
engaged, repeatedly if necessary, until destroyed. Thus,
the objective of defeating every attacker ensures that
enough missile resources are allocated during the attack to
conduct necessary engagements. Unfortunately, the objective
may not always be achievable. In an actual battle, the
intensity of an attack could saturate a coordination scheme
or even an individual ship's missile systems. The saturated
scheme or system could then allow some attackers to get
through the defense without being destroyed. The existence
of any such potential weakness in a coordination scheme can
be discovered in a simulation by incrementing the attack
size until the scheme becomes saturated. Such inputs to the
simulation will be suggested in Chapter V.
The second resource allocation objective, which was
to use the fewest number of missiles to defeat the attack,
is intended to prevent the waste of missile resources on
redundant engagements (overkill) . Overkill can occur when
missiles are fired at an attacker which has already been
destroyed or when more than one ship engages the same
attacker simultaneously. Some coordination schemes
intentionally assign multiple ships to simultaneously engage
a single attacker in order to improve the probability of
kill (Pk) . Such intentional overkill reduces sustainability
by often wasting missile resources. Sustainability can be
improved by using only the fewest number of missiles
required, thus depleting inventories no more than necessary.
The third allocation objective, assigning ships to
attackers such that no ship is forced to exhaust magazine
inventory unless all ships are nearing zero inventory,
involves the concept of load sharing . The specific ships
which launch the missiles that defeat the attack are of
little concern as long as all attackers are destroyed.
However, danger can occur when ships begin to exhaust their
inventories. While all ships remain capable, each ship
supports the defense of the force by defending itself and
others as necessary. If a ship exhausts its missile
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inventory, it can no longer lend support for the defense of
the force. It must also be defended by other ships of the
force, increasing the burden on the other ships. This loss
of firepower could allow attackers through the defense,
causing catastrophic results. Load sharing, then, promotes
the depletion of missile inventories evenly throughout the
force, preventing any one ship, or ships, from expending
magazines prematurely. This results in a force which can
defend itself to its greatest potential until it exhausts
its missile supply as a whole.
B. TWO COORDINATION SCHEMES
The goals of survivability and sustainability have been
presented along with factors which influence their
attainment. A force coordination scheme can support the
survivability and sustainability goals through the efficient
use of battle space and careful resource allocation. One
coordination scheme is called the earliest intercept scheme,
and the ways in which it relates to the goals and
considerations presented, will now be discussed.
1. The Earliest Intercept Scheme
Neglecting efficient resource allocation
considerations, a natural choice for Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
coordination is a scheme based upon earliest intercept time.
In this scheme, all ships of the force that find a
particular unengaged attacker engageable relay their
computed missile intercept time to a designated control ship
for comparison. The ship with the earliest projected
intercept time is then directed to engage the attacker. The
assigned ship will engage the attacker, repeatedly if
necessary, until the attacker is destroyed or until the ship
can no longer engage the attacker because of physical
limitations such as minimum missile range or zero missile
inventory.
Each ship's projected intercept time is computed from
the physical location and flight profile of the attacker,
the flight characteristics of the missile to be fired, and
fire control system and missile launcher availability.
Thus, a ship which is currently burdened by ongoing missile
engagements would probably submit a later projected
intercept time than would an unburdened ship, since an
unburdened ship does not have to wait for equipment to
become available to support the missile launch.
Survivability is supported by the earliest intercept
scheme through the efficient use of battle space. The ship
which can intercept the attacker first is the one assigned.
This method makes good use of battle space by intercepting
attackers at the greatest range possible under a given set
of circumstances.
Sustainability is not well supported by the earliest
intercept scheme because the missile inventory of individual
ships is not considered when assignments are made. Although
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the scheme may prove to be an effective method for
survivability, ships located closest to the direction from
which the attack occurs would likely expend their magazines
prematurely. This would occur because their proximity to
the threat would cause them to be assigned the vast majority
of attackers without regard to their magazine level. Once
empty, there is now a reduction in the overall defense of
the force. Some consideration for magazine inventory
appears to be necessary in order to improve sustainability.
(Note that it is possible for attacks to occur from more
than one direction, but for simplicity in this study,
attacks will only occur from one direction.)
The load sharing modification to the Earliest Intercept
coordination scheme is a heuristic approach to the issues
discussed. The scheme attempts to make maximum use of
battle space, though it will trade-off some battle space to
support the efficient allocation of resources.
2. The Earliest Intercept Scheme with Load Sharing
In order to utilize the benefits of the Earliest
Intercept approach and address the issue of sustainability
(missile allocation) , an adjustment considering current
magazine inventory can be added to the earliest intercept
scheme. Reports to the designated control ship in the force
now becomes a ratio of the projected intercept time over
that ship's current magazine level. For example, ship i
11





where T,- is the projected time
to intercept the attacker and the integer M, is the current
missile inventory for its magazine (s) . When M, equals zero,
then ship i has no missiles in inventory, and is no longer
of value to the scheme and thus not considered. Each time
an attacker is identified for engagement by the force, the
ship with the smallest ratio is chosen to engage that
attacker. The result when missile inventory throughout the
force is evenly distributed (the denominators of the ratio
are near equal) , is a pure earliest intercept time
engagement. When there is a disparity between missile
inventories, this ratio allows trade-offs between intercept
time and load leveling.
There exists a chance that survivability could be
reduced while using the load sharing modification. The
trade-off of time represents a potential waste of battle
space. By giving up the time, and accordingly the distance,
one or more opportunities to fire a missile salvo may be
given up. This potential decrease in survivability should
be examined carefully.
C. TWO EXTREME CASES FOR LOAD SHARING
Two extreme cases for the load sharing feature occur as
a result of the positioning of ships relative to the
direction from which the attack occurs. Figure 2
illustrates the two cases. It should be noted that, by
12



















Extreme cases for Load Sharing
The first extreme case of the load sharing concept
occurs when two or more firing ships fall on the same axis
with the inbound attacker. The difference in intercept
times, not considering fire-control system and missile
launcher scheduling, becomes the time-of-flight difference
for the more distant ship's missiles to reach the attacker.
The other extreme occurs when missile flight distances
approach equality. The equal flight distances could result
in having near equal intercept times. In this case, the
ship with the greater missile inventory will be assigned to
engage the attacker.
In the first case the intercept time difference will
reduce the tendency to load share. However, sufficient
13
missile level disparities between the ships will override
the intercept time. The override will cause a ship with a
greater missile inventory, but a later intercept time, to be
assigned to the attacker. Assigning a ship with a later
intercept time could cause the waste of potentially vital
battle space.
It remains to be seen whether or not the load sharing
feature would severely reduce the survivability performance
of the earliest intercept scheme. In Chapter IV, measures
of effectiveness will be presented which can be used to
determine the value of load sharing.
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III. DESCRIPTION OF SAMS
Now that the two schemes have been presented, this
chapter briefly describes the Systems Analysis Method by
Simulation (SAMS) , the simulation program in which the
earliest intercept scheme with load sharing concept will be
implemented. The first section in this chapter presents an
overview of SAMS. The second section discusses a difficulty
in programming a coordination scheme such as one based on
intercept time.
A. OVERVIEW
The simulation used, called SAMS, is a discrete event
simulation developed at The Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory by Edward A. Davis and Bruce Bundsen. Its
purpose is to simulate the performance of shipboard AAW
systems. Intership communications are explicitly modeled in
SAMS, permitting evaluation of alternate force coordination
schemes. Specifically, emphasis can be placed on engagement
control doctrine. [Ref. l:p.A.2 3] This is
especially useful in the analysis of the earliest intercept
scheme with load sharing.
The SAMS simulation models the detect-to-engage sequence
of events in a manner similar to the way a real-world Anti-
15





Engagement coordination message flow,
Weapon assignment, and
Engagement.
The simulation is modular and object oriented in design.
Objects in SAMS simulate the real-world systems which would
be employed in an Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) scenario. Examples
of the systems which are simulated by objects in SAMS are
search radars, and missile launchers. A particular group of
specific objects can then be assembled to simulate a given
ship's combat system. To simulate the desired systems,
information needed by the objects is provided by a data
base. The data base contains three categories of
information. They are: 1) combat system configurations
organized by ship class, 2) parameters and functional
relationships of the threat and of the shipboard combat
system components, and 3) data on the performance of the
defensive systems against the threats. [Re f. 2:p. A. 2-22]
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1. Inputs to SAMS
Inputs to SAMS are divided into four categories:
• those required to characterize a simulation run;
• those required to define cases within a run;
• those required for simulation control and data
collection; and
• those required to override the data base.
[Ref. 2:p.A.2-25]
The inputs which characterize a simulation run
include:
• launch locations of the attacking elements;
• the number of defending ships, their ship classes, and
their positioning.
The inputs which define cases within a run include:
• the number and type of threat for each attacking
element;
• the type of engagement coordination used by the
defending force, (such as earliest intercept with load
sharing) ; and
• the firing doctrine for the defending ships.
Inputs for the control of the simulation include the
number of iterations to be run for each case, the total
amount of computer time dedicated to the run, which data to




After executing the desired number of iterations of
a specific case, SAMS will continue the simulation run until
all defined cases have been completed.
Information in the data base can be overridden for a
simulation run or for any case within a run. It is useful
to override the data base for parametric studies of
defensive capabilities. For instance, a particular
coordination scheme may be better suited against targets
which fly slower, while another scheme may be better against
faster flying targets. Thus, overrides of the data base can
be input to vary target speeds in order to explore such
capability differences between schemes.
2 . Output
The SAMS simulation output can be tailored to the
analysis at hand. This enables flexibility in the choice of
data to collect. Some examples of the data which can be
collected include the numbers and timing of targets which
penetrate the defense (penetrators) , the number of targets
killed (kills) , the number of weapons used by the defender
during the engagement (firepower) , range distributions of
target engagement and target kill.[Ref. 2:p. A. 2-28]
Measures of effectiveness will be discussed in greater
detail in the next chapter.
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B. DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTATION
Neither the earliest intercept nor the load sharing
modification have yet been implemented in SAMS. The
difficulty which has been encountered at The Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory has been related to
engagement scheduling for an entire class of "bidding"
schemes. A bidding scheme is one which allows each ship to
make independent bids to engage each attacker, and both of
the coordination schemes considered here are bidding
schemes. For instance, the bid in the earliest intercept
time scheme is the computed time of intercept for each ship
who finds a particular attacker engageable. The ship with
the earliest intercept time "wins" the bid. The load
sharing modification also uses a bid, where the bid is a
ratio of intercept time and missile inventory.
A problem with such a concept arises from the fact that,
because of location or any number of factors, different
ships will detect attackers at different times. For
instance, if one ship detects an attacker and makes a bid on
it before other ships make the detection, then there is no
chance for comparison of bids before an assignment is made.
Perhaps only seconds after the first ship wins that
uncontested bid, another ship, which could achieve an
earlier intercept time for that attacker, makes the
detection but is not assigned.
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The difficulty has delayed implementation of bidding
schemes in the simulation. Though the problems are being
solved, the delay has precluded the actual analysis of data
on the performance of these schemes in this thesis. As a
result, only an exploration of potential measures of
effectiveness and a structure for comparison will be
presented. It is hoped that data will be available from
SAMS runs of these schemes in late 1991.
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR AAW COORDINATION SCHEMES
As discussed in Chapter III, SAMS output can be tailored
to support the measures of effectiveness of interest. There
are a variety of measures of effectiveness that can be used
to compare two anti-air warfare coordination schemes. The
choice of specific measures of effectiveness to be used in
this type of analysis is the subject of continuing
discussion among members of the Force Threat Evaluation and
Weapon Assignment (FTEWA) working group in the Naval Warfare
Analysis and Naval Ship Systems Departments of The Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. [Re f. 3] In
this chapter various measures of effectiveness which appear
relevant to the goals of coordination in Anti-Air Warfare
and recognized by the FTEWA working group will be presented
and discussed.
Two primary goals of coordinating the ships of a force
in an Anti-Air Warfare scenario are: 1) to improve the
force's ability to survive attack, and 2) to improve the
ability of the force to sustain that survivability for as
long as possible. Measures of survivability and
sustainability will be the primary focus of this study.
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A. MEASURES RELATING TO SURVIVABILITY
Survivability can be quantified by measures relating to
the number and characterization of the attackers which are
not destroyed by missile engagements, the number of
opportunities to fire at the attackers, and the distance at
which the attackers are killed. Data for the following
measures of effectiveness can be collected during simulation
runs by SAMS:
The number of penetrators,
The number of free-riders,
The number of kills prior to the first penetrator,
Depth of fire, and
Ranges of kills.
Each of these five measures will be discussed individually.
A basic measure of effectiveness relating to
survivability of the force is a count of penetrators.
Penetrators are attackers (targets which are inbound to one
or more units of the force) which are not destroyed by
missile engagements. (A missile engagement is the physical
act of firing a missile at an attacker.) Penetrators are a
subset of the overall number of attackers, and may or may
not have actually been engaged. They are distinguished only
by the fact that they were not destroyed by area defense
missiles.
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The proportion of attackers which are penetrators can be
indicative of the performance of a coordination scheme.
During an attack, each penetrator must be dealt with by the
secondary, or a ship's self-defense, weapons. The role and
effectiveness of such weapons is not the intention of this
study and will not be discussed here. Intuitively however,
a reduction of the number of penetrators, which are
attackers that challenge these defenses, also reduces the
number of possible hits made on the force during the attack.
Such a reduction in the number of potential hits suggests
greater survivability. Thus, a scheme which allows a
smaller proportion of penetrators than a competing scheme is
desired.
A subset of penetrators is the set of attackers which
satisfy the above definition of penetrators, but are not
engaged by any area defense missiles. A count of these
attackers, called free riders , will also be used in this
analysis. The proportion of free riders to penetrators has
potential to point out weaknesses in a coordination scheme.
Because a free rider is a penetrator which was never
engaged by area defense missiles, it is important to
consider why that penetrator was not engaged. In
structuring the simulation, it is possible to present
unengageable attackers to the defending force. Attackers
can be unengageable for a variety of reasons. Some attacker
flight profiles could exceed individual ship combat system
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capabilities, thereby making the attacker unengageable. The
intensity of the attack could be such that the individual
ship combat systems become overwhelmed regardless of the
coordination scheme used, leaving some of the attackers
unengageable. It is also possible that the coordination
scheme used does not efficiently assign specific ships to
specific attackers. As a result, the proportion of free
riders increases as heavily ourdened ships become
overwhelmed.
The combat ability of each individual ship's primary
missile system is not of direct concern in this study. The
efficient coordination of such systems, on the other hand,
is the concern. The desire then is to structure the
simulation to have no free riders which occur as a result of
the attackers exceeding combat system capability. This can
be accomplished by using attackers which would individually
be considered engageable. The number and direction of the
attackers can then be varied in order to expose the
strengths and weaknesses of the coordination schemes.
The relationships between attackers (A)
,
penetrators
(P) , free riders (F) , attackers which are engaged (E) , and










F E P D > E-D-P-F
Figure 3
Relationships of Survivability Measures
Notice that (E - D) represents the set of attackers which
were engaged but not destroyed, and (P - F) represents the
set of penetrators that were engaged. These are indeed the
same set.
The third survivability measure, the number of kills
prior to the first penetrator . indicates a coordination
scheme's ability to prevent being saturated. A small number
of kills prior to the first penetrator suggests that the
coordination scheme may be easily saturated. This might
occur because the scheme does not efficiently distribute the
assignments of attackers to ships. Again, this would cause
individual ships to become overwhelmed and unable to make
all required engagements. A small number of kills prior to
the first penetrator may also be due to the scheme's
inability to process the assignments in time. In either
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case, by keeping the attack and defense configurations
constant and varying only the coordination schemes, we can
use this measure to examine any potential differences in
efficiency.
Depth of fire , the fourth measure, is a count of the
number of hypothetical engagements which can be carried out
against a particular undestroyed attacker, before it reaches
the minimum range of area defense missiles. Each
hypothetical engagement includes the assignment of a
missile, or missiles, to the attacker, the firing of the
missile(s), the flight of the missile(s) to the intercept
point, and an evaluation period to determine whether or not
the attacker was killed. During the simulation, the depth
of fire for a specific attacker can be measured at each ship
individually, or can be a composite, force-wide, measure. A
force-wide measure is the depth of fire value of the ship
with the most firing opportunities (at that specific
attacker) of all the ships of the force. Keeping the type
of attacker and the defending force composition constant,
depth of fire is primarily affected by the speed of a scheme
in assigning ships to attackers. The faster a scheme makes
assignments, the more likely it is that the depth of fire
will be a greater number. Because each engagement has a
known (or computable) probability of kill, an increase in
depth of fire indicates an increase in the probability that
the attacker will be destroyed. Accordingly, greater depth
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of fire is desired. In order to make use of depth of fire
as a measure of effectiveness, the mean depth of fire
against all attackers can be used and the simulation
structured so that each attacker will have identical
characteristics
.
The final survivability measure, ranges of kills , is a
list of the ranges from each firing ship to attackers they
are engaging when the attackers are killed. Ranges at which
attackers are killed can be attributed to many factors. The
attacker's flight characteristics are one consideration. A
high flying attacker is more likely to be killed at greater
range than a low flyer because low flying attackers are not
detected at as great a range as high flying attackers.
Another consideration, again, is the speed that the scheme
makes assignments. Greater ranges of attacker kills are
desired and are suggestive of an efficient coordination
scheme. As with depth of fire, ranges of kills will be
averaged in order to provide a meaningful, composite,
measure.
B. MEASURES RELATING TO SUSTAINABILITY
As discussed above, the ability of a force with limited
resources to sustain operations for longer periods of time
is another goal of a coordination scheme. An attempt to
quantify sustainability could include reliability
considerations of individual combat systems as well as the
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logistical procedures usri by the force. However, these
factors will be assumed constant for the purposes of this
study. Sustainability will be measured primarily by the
relative efficiency with which resources (missiles) are
allocated. The data for the following measures of
effectiveness relating to resource allocation can be
gathered during the simulation by SAMS:
• Magazine usage (missiles fired) by each ship,
• Remaining missile inventory for each ship,
• The total number of missiles fired by the force, and
• The number of redundant engagements.
Magazine usage by each ship is a measure which is used
to determine whether one or more ships are expending
substantially more missiles than other ships in the force.
"Substantially more" is a relative term. Utilizing either
the remaining missile inventory measure or the magazine
usage measure, two coordination schemes might be compared by
noting which scheme provides a more equal missile
expenditure throughout the force.
Differing magazine usage between ships of the force is
not terribly important until one or more of the ships has
expended all or nearly all of its missiles. Prior to that
situation, each ship retains its own capability. By
retaining that capability, each ship can then support the
force in whichever coordination scheme is being used.
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However, the defensive capability of the force may be
reduced when one or more of the ships loses full capability
by exhausting its supply of missiles. Ships which are
located closest to the attack, or are equipped with more
capable missile systems than other ships, are more likely to
expend their missile inventories faster than ships which are
located farther from the attack or which are less capable.
Again, this is not necessarily a bad situation unless a
reduction in the defense appears because a ship has expended
its entire missile inventory, while other ships in the force
have gone under-utilized. Most ships will carry more than
enough missiles to destroy a small number of attackers.
Missile allocation becomes more critical in a large attack
or series of small attacks when resupply is infeasible.
Because it is the potential reductions in the defense
which are the primary concern, a better measure of
effectiveness might be the count of missiles remaining on
each ship. This measure, called remaining missiles in
inventory , can be used to determine whether any ships of the
force reach zero missiles in inventory. It is similar to
the M,- value discussed in Chapter II. The measure differs
only in that it is the final number of missiles in inventory
at the end of the simulation run. If, after the attack (s)
,
a ship has empty magazines while other ships retain
inventories not close to zero, then a potential weakness in
missile allocation may have appeared. This measure, unlike
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the measure described above, does not depend on initially
equal magazine inventories to be of value. This is
important because, in reality, ships would likely enter
battle with unequal missile inventories.
The total number of missiles fired bv the force can also
be used to measure the efficiency of the coordination
scheme. As discussed above, the allocation of the fewest
resources to defeat the attack, that is, preventing all
attackers from becoming penetrators, is desired. A scheme
which can defeat an attack by expending fewer missiles is
more efficient than a scheme which defeats a similar attack,
but requires the expenditure of more missiles. Under no
circumstances, however, would the allocation of fewer
resources be acceptable if it caused a reduction in
performance as measured by penetrators or free riders.
The final sustainability measure, the number of
redundant engagements , is a count of the situations when an
attacker is engaged unnecessarily. An unnecessary
engagement occurs when a ship engages an attacker that has
been evaluated as killed or is already engaged by another
ship. It should be noted that some coordination schemes
assign multiple ships to engage a single attacker. Such
schemes intentionally assign redundant engagements in order
to ensure high probabilities of kill. A large number of
redundant engagements during an attack, however, reduces
sustainability as a result of the wasted resources.
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Again, the survivability and sustainability measures
just described can be recorded from SAMS runs for each
coordination scheme and compared for significant differences
in measures of effectiveness. The structure of this
evaluation will be described in the following chapter.
C. SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-INDEPENDENCE
Though each of the eight measures relating to
survivability and sustainability presented above are
specific measures of effectiveness, many are related. This
relationship, or non- independence between the measures,
could allow some of the measures to be discarded without
diminishing the results of the study. Eliminating some of
these measures would streamline the data analysis effort
after running the simulation. Some potential relationships
between the measures of effectiveness relating to
survivability will now be discussed.
Free riders are related to penetrators by definition.
Because free riders are a subset of penetrators, the number
of free riders cannot exceed the number of penetrators. An
increase or decrease in the number of penetrators could be
caused by a like change in the number of free riders.
However, the proportion of penetrators which are free riders
would not be expected to remain constant. Penetrators which
are not free riders could increase, for instance, if the
probability of kill (Pk) of a missile against a particular
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type of attacker was low. On the other hand, the proportion
of free riders could increase if a sufficiently large number
of attackers were to overwhelm a coordination scheme. The
principal reason to keep both the penetrator and free rider
measures would be to investigate the characterization of
attackers which eluded area defense missiles. This would be
accomplished using the proportion of penetrators which were
free riders. The free rider measure could probably be
discarded in a study seeking only to know which coordination
scheme is "better"
.
The number of kills prior to the first penetrator is
less likely to be related to the number of penetrators than
free riders. Though its name implies that it is related to
the penetrator measure, the number of kills prior to the
first penetrator is not as concerned with the number of
penetrators as it is with the potential interarrival times
of the penetrators. Interarrival times between penetrators,
if there are any penetrators at all, are potentially
critical to the contribution a coordination scheme makes to
the survivability of the force (a short interarrival time,
or small number of kills prior to a penetrator, translates
into greater strain on other defenses) . It is not likely,
then, that this measure would be discarded.
The two other measures which have an obvious potential
relationship are depth of fire and ranges of kills. If most
kills are occurring at great range, then it is likely that
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depth of fire is also great. In other words, the greater
the average distance that targets are being killed, the more
likely there would be opportunity to shoot at them again if
required. Ranges of kills are dependent upon the
probability of kill (Pk) of each shot. Such probability is
not the concern of this study and, consequently, probability
of kill for each shot could be kept constant for simulation
purposes. By using a constant Pk for each engagement, the
ranges of kills measure would likely be as valuable as the
depth of fire measure, and can be observed from simulation
runs, where as depth of fire must be computed. If ranges of
kills and depth of fire were closely related, then it would
be possible to omit depth of fire as a measure.
The potential relationships of the measures relating to
sustainability are also of interest. The total number of
missiles fired by the force is the sum of the number fired
by each force unit. There is little need to check for the
relationship between these measures. The total number was
included as a summary measure of the efficiency of the force
against an attack. However, as discussed above, a better
measure concerning efficient missile allocation was the
missiles remaining measure. Accordingly, by using the
missiles remaining in inventory measure, it would be
possible to omit the total number of missiles fired and
magazine usage by each ship measures.
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The number of redundant engagements is also very likely
to correspond with the number of missiles fired by each ship
and the total missiles fired measures. By keeping attack
size constant, the number of redundant engagements can
easily be deduced from either the missile usage measure or
the missiles remaining measure.
By checking for these relationships between measures of
effectiveness, it is possible to reduce the number of
measures from the original eight to three or four
potentially independent measures. The measures which appear
to have the least redundancy which relate to survivability
are:
• The number of penetrators,
• The number of kills prior to the first penetrator, and
• Ranges of kills.
The most promising measure relating to sustainability is:
• Remaining missiles in inventory for each ship.
This reduction in the number of measures to consider
would greatly reduce the amount of effort required to set up
simulation runs and process the data after the runs.
Checking for independence of the measures could be
accomplished by making a test run of the simulation and
compiling a covariance matrix of the MOE values. Those
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measures which appear closely correlated could then be
discarded as described above.
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V. STRUCTURE OF SIMULATION RUMS TO COMPARE THE AAW
COORDINATION 8CHEMES
The chapters thus far have presented and discussed
two coordination schemes, a simulation program likely to
test the schemes, and some measures of effectiveness which
relate to survivability and sustainability. This chapter
will present a plan for simulation runs to compare the
earliest intercept coordination scheme with the earliest
intercept scheme modified to include a load sharing feature.
A. BASIS FOR COMPARISON
There are two primary interests for a comparison between
these schemes. They are to determine whether the load
sharing feature: 1) increases sustainability, and 2)
decreases survivability. The load sharing feature is
intended to increase sustainability. Accordingly,
sustainability must be increased in order to consider load
sharing a success. As discussed in Chapter IV, however,
sustainability should not be increased at the expense of
survivability. Therefore, regardless of performance
relating to sustainability, the load sharing scheme should
not be considered successful if it causes a significant
decrease in survivability.
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The evaluation can be composed of simulation runs of
various scenarios. For each scenario, like measures of
effectiveness for the schemes can then be compared by
hypothesis tests for significant statistical differences.
From the results of the comparison on each measure,
conclusions can then be drawn on the overall performance of
the load sharing feature.
B. THE SIMULATION SCENARIOS
As discussed in Chapter IV, it is necessary to be aware
of the sometimes sensitive nature of each of the measures of
effectiveness. Care must be used to ensure that the
coordination schemes alone are being tested. For example,
presenting attackers in the simulation which are
individually unengageable to the defending force would
provide little insight into the performance of the
coordination schemes. The scenarios should also be simple
in nature. The simplicity will aid in the isolation of
causes and effects regarding the performance of the schemes.
The simulation runs to compare the two schemes can be
structured as follows. All runs would consist of three
ships in a column formation. Because of the large relative
speed difference, between ships and modern aircraft, the
ships can be fixed in position throughout the simulation.
The lead ship and the trailing ship of the column will be
designated as the missile firing ships. These ships will
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defend themselves, each other, and the third ship (in the
center of the column) . Initial spacing between ships will
be 5,000 yards. In order to detect whether ship spacing has
any effect on scheme performance, spacing will be varied in
successive runs to 2,500 yards and 10,000 yards
respectively.
The attack direction will be varied in order to
determine whether or not attack direction changes the
performance of the coordination schemes. Attacks will be
made against the column of ships (the force) from one of
three possible directions. One attack direction should be
from 000 degrees relative from the center ship, another from
045 degrees relative, and the third from 090 degrees
relative. The 000 and 090 directions will test the extreme
cases for the load sharing feature as discussed in Chapter
II. Attack sizes can also be varied. Attack sizes of 15,
30 , and 60 attackers should provide enough stress on the
schemes to uncover potential limitations in the schemes.
Figure 4 illustrates attack directions and ship spacing.
Coordination scheme performance might also be affected by
the type of attackers against which it must perform. The
types of attackers can be generic in nature and will be
described by their flight profiles. They are defined as
follows: Type 1) low and slow, Type 2) low and fast, and
Type 3) high diver (fast) . The actual speed and altitude
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Figure 4
Attack Directions and Ship Spacing
classification of the study will allow. Each attack should
consist of like attackers, and each attacker, if alone,
should be engageable to the force. Again, engageability is
a function of missile system capability versus attacker
flight characteristics.
The following table is a summary of the variable
scenario inputs which have been discussed.
Table I SCENARIO INPUTS
Ship spacing: 2,500yds. 5,000yds. 10,000yds.
Attack directions: 000 045 090 deg R
Number of attackers: 15 30 60
Attacker types: Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
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There are three cases for each of the four factors being
varied. A complete set of data for all combinations would
require 3 , or 81, different runs of the simulation for each
scheme
.
For each set of conditions, repeated simulation of
attacks would yield differing results since the simulation
randomizes the occurrence of such variables as attacker
arrivals, targeted ships, and range of detection.
Replications made during each run permit the computation of
mean and variance values for each measure. Replication
also allows an appeal to the Central Limit Theorem for use
of test statistics which approximate normality for sample
means. A run for each combination of the scenario inputs
described above (for each coordination scheme) would provide
sufficient data to go on to the comparison of the schemes.
C. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The hypothesis test on each measure of effectiveness
will consist of a null hypothesis and a two-tailed alternate
hypothesis. Tests for equality of means, proportions and
variance can be done on selected measures.
1. How the Measures can be Tested
The measures described in Chapter IV are related to
either survivability or sustainability. It is desired to
know whether ad sharing increases ustainability without
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decreasing survivability. The tests must then be
constructed to provide this information.
a. Measures Relating to Survivability
As discussed earlier, we are interested in any
potential decrease in survivability resulting from load
sharing. A potential decrease in survivability could be
indicated by an increase in the numbers of penetrators or
free-riders. Accordingly, we can test for any such increase
in these measures when the load sharing scheme is used.
The mean number of penetrators for each scheme
can be compared for equality. The null hypothesis, H , for
all tests for equality of means discussed in this section,
will state /a, = ^2* The alternate hypothesis, Ha , will state
/i
1
* j*2 • The mean number of free-riders can also be
compared between the schemes in a like manner. However, the
free-rider measure is closely related to the penetrator
measure and may be omitted.
In general it is expected that the number of
penetrators will be small. It then may be difficult to
distinguish any differences between the schemes for this
measure. As discussed in Chapter IV, it could be beneficial
to test the proportion of attackers which are penetrators.
Because of the relationship between penetrators and
attackers, more information is captured in the proportion.
A test on a proportion, similar to the test on the mean,
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candidate for equality of means. It may be interesting,
however, to also include the total missiles fired measure in
a test for equality of means.
A final test which may be of interest for all the
survivability and sustainability measures discussed above
would be a test for equal variance. The variability of the
measures could prove to be insightful prior to drawing any
conclusions about which scheme performs better. A scheme
which performs slightly better than the other in a test on
the mean may have more variability. That extra variability
may not be desirable.
Tests for equality of means, proportions and
variance will now be described.
2. Testing for Equality of Means
One of the three tests is a test for equality of
means. The null hypothesis will state that the mean for all
replications of that measure corresponding to one
coordination scheme is equal to the mean for that measure
corresponding to the other scheme, Mi = M2» The two wav
alternate hypothesis will state that the mean values of that
measure are not equal, /i
1
# /x2 .
When testing a hypothesis for the difference of two
means where a, and a2 are unknown but assumed equal, a t-
test (using the t statistic) is called for. In this case,
standard deviation of the data is not known and, in fact,
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may not be equal between the schemes. The uncertainty about
this potential inequality could lead to first testing for
the equality of a, and a2 . This is not necessary, however,
because a special test can be used. The test, called the









as if it had a t distribution with degrees of freedom given
by















In this case, n
1
and n2 represent the number of replications






Unfortunately, even given a value for a, a critical
region cannot be computed in advance because the formula for
degrees of freedom uses the observed variance.
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3. Testing for the Equality of Proportions
If it is desired to test for equality of the
proportions between the two schemes, a common proportion can
be estimated by
P* — , (3)
which is a weighted average of the sample proportions. As
stated before however, n, = n2 = n, so the common proportion
can be simplified to
This can then be used to estimate the standard deviation of





With a chance of type I error, a = 0.05, then the two tailed





4. Testing for Equality of Variance
The third test compares the ratio of observed
variances to the F distribution.
where v, = v 2 = n - 1. The critical values can then be
computed for the two tailed test as F,.^ and F
a/2 . Values of
the ratio which fall outside of the region bounded by these
critical values indicate that the hypothesis of equal




This chapter will discuss some final thoughts regarding
the load sharing idea, measures of effectiveness, testing
procedures, and recommendations for continued work.
A. HOPES FOR AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE LOAD SHARING CONCEPT
The load sharing concept, as it has been described in
modifying the earliest intercept scheme, is not limited to
the modification of only the earliest intercept scheme. It
may be proven that earliest intercept is not effective
enough to warrant the purchase of the systems necessary to
implement it. If so, then load sharing can be compared in
the modification of a more economically feasible scheme.
The intent of load sharing is to allow the force to
fight area defense battles with sustained capability for as
long as resources will permit. However, it is understood
that load sharing may give up potentially crucial time and
space where time and space may be the most precious of all
commodities. It is for this reason that the interest arose
to explore the relative value of load sharing in a
coordination scheme.
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B. THE CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
There are numerous measures of effectiveness regarding
area defense in AAW. The Force Threat Evaluation and
Weapons Assignment (FTEWA) working group has identified 22
primary measures. [Ref . 3]
It can be argued, as in Chapter IV, that many measures
of effectiveness regarding area defense are redundant. Of
the 22 measures identified by the FTEWA working group, only
nine were mentioned in this thesis. Of the nine measures,
four or five could easily be omitted as being redundant. It
is hoped that the explanations accompanying the surviving
measures is insightful.
C. SOME THOUGHTS ON TESTING PROCEDURES
The use of hypothesis testing in this study is based on
a desire to determine whether one AAW coordination scheme
out perforrs another with regard to specific measures of
effectiveness. Another method available, which would
provide greater detail into the differences in performance,
would be to compute confidence intervals on the difference
of two means. Such confidence intervals could provide some




It is hoped that the work presented here will be useful
to those interested in selecting an area defense
coordination scheme for force AAW. Recommendations for
continued analysis of this subject include the use of data
generated by SAMS, using the schemes and testing structure
presented here, to examine any possible value in load
sharing. Additionally, analysis of variance could be used
to determine which inputs, such as attacker types or ship
spacing, are most critical to the success of a load sharing,
or any, coordination scheme.
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